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L’auteure explore le développement de l’intersectionalité- cette 
approche féministe aux différents champs d’enquêtes- dans 
le contexte de la loi sur les droits humains internationaux. 
Tout d’abord ce texte remet en mémoire le développement 
et les limites de la CEDEF qui avait comme mandat de 
protéger les droits humains internationaux des femmes. 
Ensuite il retrace les multiples usages de l’intersectionalité à 
l’intérieur de la sphère domestique en mettant l’accent sur les 
origines de la loi. On connaît peu les débuts de ce nouveau 
concept surtout de son rôle de protecteur auprès des femmes 
quand il s’agit de la discrimination raciale. (CEDR). Des 
recherches récentes apportées par l’auteure ont noté l’intérêt 
des Nations Unies pour l’ntersectionalité lors de la violation 
massive des droits humains et les violences sexuelles envers 
les femmes en Bosnie-Herzegovine et au Rwanda. Ce texte 
envisage la possibilité d’élargir les cadres des droits humains 
internationaux pour établir une protection domestique et 
transnationale pour les femmes.
The acceptance of an intersectional vocabulary at the 
international level opens up a space for feminist engage-
ment. It offers the future possibility for feminist dialogue 
within the law—as opposed to one that merely focuses on 
the law. Such an approach keeps with intersectionality’s 
counterhegemonic impetus by offering an epistemological 
guide to engage law’s political, symbolic and structural 
limits and how structural conditions inform them.
—Kathryn Henne (para. 33, emphasis in original)
Intersectionality is familiar to feminist discourse in nu-
merous fields and activist circles; so much so that is has 
been accused of becoming a “buzzword” (Davis 67). I 
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define intersectionality, provisionally, for the purposes 
of this introduction, at the individual claimant and jur-
isprudential levels, as an approach to anti-discrimination 
and equality law that attempts to move beyond static 
conceptions (Grabham et al. 1) and fixed “identities” of 
discriminated subjects, and, based on the metaphor of a 
traffic intersection, delineates the “flow” of discrimination 
as multi-directional, and injury as seldom attributable to 
a single source (Crenshaw “Demarginalizing” 149).
But how much do we know about its formal adoption 
in international human rights law? What issues did the 
framework address, and how did it come about? What 
potential does intersectionality have to clarify preexisting 
understanding and application of women’s human rights?
Single Axis Protections and International Human 
Rights 
Deliberations about the universality of international 
human rights standards, and the extent to which they 
are colonial (see Moyn), neo-colonial (see Baxi), part 
of structural adjustment strategies of the global north 
(see Dezalay and Garth), or culturally determined (see 
Nyamu)1 frequently occur in the context of debates over 
women’s human rights. Often, states will use culture as 
a defense to encroachment on women’s rights,2 posing a 
clash between the rights guaranteed by international hu-
man rights law under the complex rubric of culture and 
the protections offered to women qua women. According 
to Michael Freeman, “[w]omen suffer much more than 
men from justifications of the violations of almost all their 
human rights by appeals to culture” (3). Existing side by 
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side with this, are hegemonic notions of women’s rights 
emanating from the global north, in which non-Western 
women are often represented as if, in the words of Leti 
Volpp, they exist in a “permanently anterior time, with 
gender subordination uniquely integral to their culture” 
(“Feminism” 1201). This is posited as a counterbalance to 
States’ regressive policies toward women, and yet operates 
as a mirror to States’ simplistic evocation of culture to 
defend violations. At the international level, intersection-
ality arose out of the legacy of contestation regarding the 
universality, coverage and meaning of the Treaties’ pro-
tections for those who experienced multiple grounds of 
discrimination simultaneously. Its adoption by CEDAW 
in particular was intended to provide jurisprudential heft 
to the deliberations and exchanges among and between 
various UN institutions, NGOs, and women activists 
from the Global South at public forums and through the 
academy, by deploying the language of intersectionality 
(Bond). Likewise, the intersectional analysis of  Canadian 
groups such as the Feminist Alliance for International 
Action (FAFIA), and the Native Women’s Association 
of Canada, directly led to CEDAW’s inquiry into the 
gross human rights violations that Indigenous women 
in Canada experience, resulting in the UN recommen-
dation for a national inquiry into missing and murdered 
Indigenous women. Can intersectionality put some of the 
preexisting binary and oppositional approaches to rights’ 
protections to rest?
At the crux of gender protection in the international 
system is the establishment of UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) (186 countries currently have ratified 
it). Like all international human rights treaties, CEDAW 
was formed both in and of its time. 
The identified need for a new mechanism for enforce-
ment of women’s rights resulted in a broadening and 
codifying of earlier UN statements of marriage and family 
rights because, “discrimination arising from customary law, 
from traditional institutions and practices, or from other 
forms of oppression not specifically defined in the covenant 
tend to be neglected” (Reanda 15). This focus on redress 
is plainly represented in the treaty’s final text for Article 
2 (f ), which requires of signatories that they undertake:
To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, 
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs 
and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women. (CEDAW art.2) 
Thus, present at the conception of CEDAW was the 
identification of the roles of “custom,” “culture,” and 
“traditional practice” as at once responsible for the invis-
ibility (appearing as natural or given) of women’s human 
rights violations and as an engine of their reproduction 
(justification of violations based on cultural defences) 
(Reanda 17). CEDAW broadened and solidified a frame-
work of setting women apart as a group in the suite of 
United Nations protections. It followed rather than led 
the particularization of delineating rights for identity 
groups; the International Convention for the Elimina-
tion of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) led 
the way in 1966. CEDAW entered this world, however, 
in a new and contentious way: while some rights were 
specified in earlier frameworks, CEDAW was to have 
the force of a treaty, and as such, it was to have pow-
ers of obligation to reach into states’ “cultures” where 
discrimination against women was embedded, causing 
concern among states for their cultural integrity (Rehof 
91). CEDAW has remained every bit as contentious as 
it was at its initiation (Rehof 2). 
Currently, sixty plus countries have registered reser-
vations to CEDAW.3 Most reservations are related to 
articles 2 and 16, which the committee deems central 
to the object and purpose of the Convention, and which 
pertain to discrimination that takes place in the family 
or as an outcome or purpose of culture, tradition and 
custom. Many states make reservations so sweeping as 
to effectively nullify state accountability; others are uni-
laterally asserted on religious grounds with no canonical 
(religious or legal) justification offered.4 States’ claims that 
a particular culture requires a reservation to CEDAW are 
often disputed by the women active for women’s rights 
within that state’s boundaries, either from the dominant 
culture or from within another, minority culture. The 
feminist-egalitarian interpretations of Islam, refuting 
state claims that the religious and cultural integrity 
of Egypt requires women’s inequality, reflected in the 
shadow reports of Morocco to CEDAW, for example, 
are but one version of the complexity of cultural claims 
as to gender norms (IWRAW). 
A Note About “Culture”
The uses put to culture in rights’ discussion often rely on 
vague notions that move chaotically across categories of 
religion, belief, ethnicity, race and multiple other markers 
of belonging. Belonging is seen by some, such as Nira 
Yurval-Davis, to be the more crucial category to an inter-
sectional approach, a concept that gets beneath culture to 
how and why culture operates and has political meaning. 
Culture is a notoriously “spacious” concept in human 
rights, as Patrick Thornberry has noted, and “finding a 
discrete substance for the right” to culture is a “complex 
undertaking” (4). While, not the primary interest here, 
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it is worth noting at a minimum, as Thornberry has, that 
bundled into the notion are a number of specific and 
discernable rights, which might well be named concretely, 
rather than tackled as an amorphous right (5). Defining 
culture is in and of itself no small task. For instance, within 
the international human rights context, the UN Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) 
General Comment 21 admits it to be “multifaceted” and 
for the purposes of the discussion at this stage, broadly 
outlined, culture encompasses, 
inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written lit-
erature, music and song, non-verbal communication, 
religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport 
and games, methods of production or technology, 
natural and man-made environments, food, cloth-
ing and shelter and the arts, customs and traditions 
through which individuals, groups of individuals 
and communities express their humanity and the 
meaning they give to their existence, and build their 
world view representing their encounter with external 
forces affecting their lives. Culture shapes and mirrors 
the values of well-being and the economic, social and 
political life of individuals, groups of individuals and 
communities. (n.107, para.3)
 
While facially neutral and descriptive, such a notion 
of culture leaves aside the operations of power and 
oppression, disadvantage and exclusion taken as the 
focus of an intersectional approach. Sally Engle Merry 
has, from the perspective of critical legal anthropology, 
recast culture precisely as “contested and as a mode of 
legitimating claims to power and authority” (Merry 9). 
The approach advocated by Andree Boiselle, in her work 
on the Stó:Lõ transition to self-rule, locates law itself in 
a spacious realm of cultural meaning based on exchange 
and normativity:
a community’s “Law” consists, at any given time, in 
a snapshot: the set of articulations, there and then, 
of the culturally shaped meanings, or underlying 
normativity, that inform community members’ ex-
pectations toward each other. (Boiselle 10)
Boiselle’s work leads to a sustained elaboration and uti-
lization of what she terms “cultural hybridity,” a concept 
worth further exploration in relation to the potential of 
intersectionality in the international human rights realm. 
The appeal of this approach rests on its refusal to fix and reify 
“culture” in the manner frequently true in traditional law 
and policy, often within protective paradigms, justifying 
the law’s move to dissolve and destroy cultural positions 
and practices in the name of improvement. Against this 
notion, Boiselle advances the following framework:
This is what I refer to … as “cultural hybridity”: 
the reinterpretation of cultural understandings that 
arises specifically from contact with another world-
view—although, as that reinterpretation occurs, I 
acknowledge that it becomes instantly very difficult 
to neatly delineate the genealogy of a given meaning, 
that is, to trace it back to a “culture of origin. (10)
While a full exploration of these matters is beyond the 
scope of this paper, I am indicating that the context of 
international human rights protection and enforcement, in 
the face of a posited clash between Western and non-West-
ern, global South against global North, women’s rights 
against cultural rights, would appear to benefit from an 
elaboration of “culture” that can allow for fluid exchange 
across cultures, account for power differentials and clarify 
terms, such as that offered by those elaborated by Merry’s 
discussion of claims to power and authority and Boiselle’s 
discussion of hybridity. In international human rights law, 
especially in light of the Vienna Declaration of the World 
Conference on Human Rights regarding the indivisibility of 
culture from all other rights, the appeal of an intersectional 
approach to rights protections seems practical. 
At its heart, CEDAW’s conceptualization of “women” 
does not conform to trends in newer UN documents 
on culture nor in wider post-colonial social theory re-
garding the reworking of singular identity “strands” into 
nuanced intersectional tapestries of social location and 
self-defined, potentially multiple and contradictory group 
affiliations5—in short, CEDAW as text does not advance 
an intersectional approach. CEDAW, qua treaty, despite 
disclaimers in the preamble as well as named layers of 
The intersectional analysis of Canadian groups such as FAFIA and the 
Native Women’s Association of Canada, directly led to CEDAW’s inquiry 
into the gross human rights violations that Indigenous women in 
Canada experience, resulting in the UN recommendation for a national 
inquiry into missing and murdered Indigenous women.
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protections,6 owes its formulation to a “single axis identity” 
model, which constructs gender as “unmediated by any 
other social forces, such as race, immigrant status, poverty, 
sexuality or imperialism” (Volpp “Talking Culture” 1581). 
An expansion of the treaty’s conceptualization of “woman” 
is however in keeping with its mandate and purpose, and 
has been initiated through General Comment 28, in 2010, 
which I will explore below. 
Intersectionality
The literature on intersectionality originated in law in the 
1980s, and has now become influential in a vast num-
ber of fields: Emily Grabham et al.’s brief survey reveals 
more than six disciplines, including socio-legal studies, 
to which it has been applied (1). As such, its potential 
reaches beyond the individual legal subject of liberalism 
into the realms of law’s political, symbolic and structural 
influences with an appealing epistemological critique 
that aims to “foreground the erasure” (Rooney 209) of 
multiply discriminated women from traditional legal 
categories and practices.
Kimberlé Crenshaw (“Demarginalizing”), whose work 
has been the centre of its deployment in women’s human 
rights law, is credited with coining it as a term, based on 
the metaphor of the traffic intersection to delineate the 
“flow” of discrimination as multi-directional, and the 
resulting injury as seldom attributable to a single source:
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, 
coming and going in all four directions. Discrimi-
nation, like traffic through an intersection, may flow 
in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an 
accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused 
by cars traveling from any number of directions, and 
sometimes from all of them. (“Demarginalizing” 149)
Her early analysis of employment law and anti-discrim-
ination cases in the American appellate and constitutional 
systems was part of a founding insight growing out of 
“critical race theory” (Crenshaw “Mapping”), and her 
work was instrumental in analyzing the ways in which 
U.S. antidiscrimination law took a “but for” approach to 
the basis of discrimination claims: that is, “but for” being 
either black, or but for being a woman, the claimant would 
have received different—equal to the “norm”—treatment. 
Thus, stripped of her complex social identity and only in 
negative relief against the putative norm of white males 
could a claimant have her situation addressed. Crenshaw’s 
work set into stark relief the way in which, “race and sex 
… became significant only when they operate to explicitly 
disadvantage the victims; because the privileging of white-
ness or maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived 
at all” (“Demarginalizing” 151).
This insight into the overarching epistemic framework 
of law, privileging white male experience, was further en-
riched by Crenshaw’s observation that gender as a basis of 
claim, was exclusively modelled on white women’s experi-
ences. The encoding of gendered and racialized identities 
as “other” and as “victims” becomes the focus in many 
adaptations of intersectionality outside law, especially in 
sociology (see Korteweg; Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality”; 
“Dialogical Epistemology” 46). 
From its outset, intersectionality had an orientation 
to policy and law reform. Crenshaw’s work was in large 
part, a project to open a dialogue between anti-racist and 
feminist activists, in which she identified how “dominant 
conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about 
subordination and disadvantage occurring along a single 
categorical axis” (“Demarginalizing” 140). This, she 
claims, yields a “distorted analysis of racism and sexism” 
and “contributes to the marginalization of Black women 
in feminist theory and anti-racist politics,” and that 
because of these predicated “discrete set of experiences,” 
the intersection of race and gender are not duly account-
ed for not only in the status quo, but in the reforming 
challenges and possible remedies. Centrally, theory and 
policy are “predicated on a discrete set of experiences that 
often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race 
and gender” (Crenshaw “Demarginalizing” 140). Since 
this early formulation “intersectionality has become the 
primary analytic tool that feminist and anti-racist scholars 
deploy for theorizing identity and oppression” (Nash 1). 
The aim of this formulation of intersectionality is to link 
the law to the lived experience of complex individuals with 
claims, and its status as an expository tool to check law’s 
tendency to instrumentalize social identity and categorize 
remedy in discrete baskets of entitlements that cannot be 
added together or compounded, remains relevant to the 
development of equality rights and anti-discrimination 
work. In the context of the widespread belief in a clash 
of claims for protection under human rights instruments 
and in liberal discourse about state duties to “accommo-
date,”7 intersectionality reminds us that it is not simply 
a matter of stacking up the claims of discretely oppressed 
persons, nor of “balancing” the single claims of a group on 
the basis of one set of protected grounds versus another. 
Intersectionality metaphorically recasts “discriminations” 
not as additive, but as mutually constitutive. Crenshaw, 
uses an example of violence against women, one particu-
larly germane to the United Nations’ goal of tackling the 
global pandemic of violence against women: “the location 
of women of colour at the intersection of race and gender 
makes our actual experience of domestic violence, rape 
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and remedial reform qualitatively different from that of 
white women” (“Beyond Racism” 3). In this example, 
Black women are not only sometimes “like” white women 
in gender, and “like” Black men in race, but often unlike 
either in an intersectional experience that constitutes its 
own form of discrimination, at times at the hands of the 
two groups they are most supposed to be “like.”
While intersectionality has been widely acknowledged 
to be an influential concept,8 it has also been accused of 
falling short of a fully elaborated theory, and of failing 
earlier, it is the arena where the “clashes” between culture 
and gender are writ large, but also where, since March 
2006, there is also overarching procedural constraint on 
segregated protections, requiring them to be examined as 
a whole through the mechanism of the Universal Periodic 
Review, monitoring the “universality, interdependence, 
indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights” 
with which States are obliged to comply with across all 
treaty bodies.
As early as 1995, the year the Beijing Declaration and 
to articulate its scope and reach (“are all subjectivities/
identities intersectional or only those multiply margin-
alized subjects?” [Nash 8]) its definition embedded in a 
“murkiness” that is inherently ambiguous as to its status 
as methodology, the number and meaning of situational 
identities it represents and their relation to its putative 
epistemic claim, and the related practical question of the 
“coherence between intersectionality and lived experiences 
of multiple identities” (Nash 4). Some have gone on to 
ask if the idea of an intersection is the “right analogy” 
(Chang and Culp 485), and others have accused it of 
merely restating earlier theories put forward in particu-
lar, by British feminist scholars of colour (Yuval-Davis, 
“Intersectionality” 193).
Taking intersectionality as a starting point, therefore, 
does not necessarily provide guidance as to the “correct” 
intersectional approach to concrete situations. Real 
life—like real identities—has a way of being “messy,”9 
and resistant to axiomatic application.
Intersectionality in International Human Rights
While the international treaty system has suffered from 
the construction of a “suite” of delineated rights based 
on various foci of oppression—at once offering a prolif-
eration of protected grounds and a corollary splintering 
of claimants into discrete identity threads—it is also an 
area of law where scholarship and practice are very close 
partners, and where intersectionality has been explicitly 
referred to in the treaty committees’ legal interpretation and 
jurisprudence, making it a live lab for the development of 
this crucial theorization of pluralistic protections. As stated 
Platform for Action for women’s equality was launched, a 
proto-intersectional framework was in evidence; however, 
it did not use the word once. The Declaration was influ-
enced by the structure of the Commission on the Status 
of Women (CSW), which is the intermediary between 
women’s civil society groups, women’s movements globally, 
and the UN women’s rights machinery, which, since 2004, 
is gathered under the entity, UN Women. 
Article 32 of the Declaration stated that governments 
must, for instance:
Intensify efforts to ensure equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
women and girls who face multiple barriers to their 
empowerment and advancement because of such 
factors as their race, age, language, ethnicity, culture, 
religion, or disability, or because they are indigenous 
people. (4)
Eight years later, the Division for the Advancement of 
Women (DAW), in collaboration with the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and 
the United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM), convened an expert group meeting on the 
theme of “Gender and Racial Discrimination.” Hosted by 
the Government of Croatia in Zagreb, the meeting took 
place from 21 to 24 November 2000. Johanna Bond and 
Nira Yuval-Davis (“Intersectionality”) are among the few 
scholars who engage overtly with the “intersectional turn” 
as such in the international human rights context. The 
underlying issues of the intersections themselves have long 
been the purview of TWAIL (Third World Approaches to 
While the international treaty system has suffered from the construction 
of a “suite” of delineated rights based on various foci of oppression … 
it is also an area of law where scholarship and practice are very close 
partners, and where intersectionality has been explicitly referred to in 
the treaty committees’ legal interpretation and jurisprudence.
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International Law) scholars (Okafor; Anghie; Buchanan; 
Parmar; Fakhri; Galindo), insisting on writing accounts 
of international law and its effects based in Third World 
experiences of them—an epistemological and ontological 
challenge to human rights law (Okafor; Parmar)—dis-
placing “positivist certainties about the autonomy and 
inherent justice of international law” (Orford, Hoffman 
and Clark 5). Feminist scholars from the Third World 
Approaches to International Law movement such as Celes-
tine Nyamu, demand a step away from “vague notions of 
culture” deployed in international human rights law, and 
instead call for a nuanced approach to how “formal legal 
institutions, culture, and customary practices interact” 
(382). Ratna Kapur counters international law’s claims of 
being the champion of women’s equality rights by showing 
that in Nepal, “UN interventions in conflict situations 
and noises around gender mainstreaming did not help 
disrupt deeply entrenched normative assumptions about 
gender…” (167). Outside the TWAIL discourse, others, 
such as observers of religious rights in human rights, Nazila 
Ghanea-Hercock (Ghanea, Stephens and Walden; Biele-
feldt, Ghanea and Wiener) and Ayala Shachar (“Religion,” 
Multicultural Jurisdictions) also concern themselves with 
the intersections of gender, minority status, and freedom 
of religion and belief, so often conflated with culture or 
marshalled against gender protections, as we have seen. 
Regional systems scholars such as Fareda Banda (“Global 
Standards,” Women), and minority rights scholars such 
as Patrick Thornberry and Alexandra Xanthaki, have 
also attended to the intersections of multiple grounds 
of discrimination, without the banner of “intersection-
ality” necessarily branding their work. Nira Yuval-Davis 
(The Politics), traces the official emergence of intersec-
tionality by name to the contemporaneous emergence 
of the framework in CERD’s General Comment 25, 
and the sequence of the preparatory documents to the 
Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial Discrimination 
that took place in Zagreb in November 2000 as part of 
the preparatory process to the UN World Conference 
Against Racism. In these meetings, the intersectional 
approach of American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw 
“occupied centre stage” (Yuval-Davis, The Politics), and 
she was asked to introduce the notion in a special session 
on the subject leading up to the Durban conference. Her 
background paper thus formed one of the key documents 
advancing the intersectional turn at the international level 
(“Gender-Related Aspects”).
An Aide Memoire of the meeting suggests that ethnic 
and racialized forms of sexual violence formed the con-
text that gave rise to the need for the Zagreb meeting.10 
Crenshaw’s paper for Zagreb appears to underscore this 
contextual impetus:
intersectional subordination by its very nature is often 
obscured both because it tends to happen to those 
who are marginal even within subordinate groups 
and because existing paradigms do not consistently 
anticipate this discrimination. (Crenshaw, “Gen-
der-Related Aspects” 15)
My research currently explores the role that the events 
of Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda, and the deployment 
of sexual violence11 as a tool of war and as an act of geno-
cide in other conflict zones, played in the acceptance of 
“intersectionality” as a framework, specifically to make 
racialized sexism and sexualized racism visible. After Bos-
nia Herzegovina, Rwanda is perhaps the watershed that 
most drew attention to the stark intersection of gender 
and race/ethnicity as targets of human rights abuses on 
such a massive and unheeded scale (Conflict-Related Sexual 
Violence).12 The framework of understanding these events 
as crimes may have important things to say about the 
scope and limits of the development of intersectionality 
at the United Nations and specifically, at CERD and 
CEDAW. By the year of the Zagreb Conference on gender 
and racial discrimination, over 100,000 Rwandans were 
suspects in genocide and awaiting trial within Rwanda 
(Conflict-Related Sexual Violence). The rape of women 
and the prosecution of the rape of women as a form of 
genocide and a crime against humanity formed an im-
portant aspect of the legal process, both in its attempts 
to address rape in a pioneering way, and in its failures 
to do so (Wood). Specific intersectional strategies to 
prosecute mass rapes have been critiqued for their legal 
erasure of women as subjects of the violence. The dom-
inant frameworks of criminal prosecution required an 
overarching adherence to ethnic identity as the targeted 
category; this meant in some cases, the rape of women 
not identified as part of the “targeted group,” required 
that the violation to be defined in terms of, for instance 
their husband’s (acknowledged to be targeted) ethnicity; 
her rape becomes a (property) crime against him (see 
Buss 105). My research shows that this foundational 
prosecutorial framework of intersectional violations, dis-
regarding the specific operations of gendered violations as 
cross cutting traditional categories, infects aspects of the 
UN’s adoption of intersectionality outside of CEDAW. 
By 2002, the UN Commission on Human Rights’ 
resolution on the human rights of women had worked 
recognition of “the importance of examining the in-
tersection of multiple forms of discrimination” into its 
language (para. 3). It was not until 2010 that the so-
called women’s treaty, CEDAW, had released a similar 
directive on how its articles should be read against the 
requirements of an intersectional approach, with the 
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above-mentioned General Comment 28. 
Taking the intersection of race and gender as a jump-
ing off point for exposing the limitations of single axis 
analyses of discrimination, the two treaty bodies most 
directly implicated in protecting women’s intersectional 
international human rights, CERD and CEDAW and 
their committees, have openly embraced the framework. 
(The treaty on disability rights the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
was crafted with an express intersectional approach as its 
States Parties to condemn discrimination against 
women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appro-
priate means and without delay a policy of eliminat-
ing discrimination against women and, to this end, 
undertake … (f ) to … modify or abolish … customs 
or practices that discriminate against women. 
It points out in paragraph 15 of General Comment 28, 
that the obligation is to “condemn discrimination against 
women in all its forms” according to Article 1, which 
starting point.) Elsewhere, I called for “days of discussion” 
between the committees to develop their mutual inter-
sectional approach to treaty interpretation, recognizing 
their “unique position to advance this discussion with 
respect to women’s human rights within culture, and 
not merely in opposition to it”  (Dale 46). Since then, 
there is evidence of a self-conscious application of in-
tersectionality in the general comments and concluding 
comments issued by both bodies, which act in law as 
directives to interpretations of their articles; in effect their 
jurisprudence. Both conventions were predicated on a 
single axis identity-based rights protection, which has 
continued with the subsequent development of particular 
protections for other identity groups, underscoring the 
possibility of elaborating intersectionality beyond the 
named protections of gender and race.13 
The Deployment of Intersectionality in CEDAW 
and CERD
The Treaty statements on intersectionality I consider 
most closely, CERD General Comment 25 and CEDAW 
General Comment 28, arose out of the same legacy of 
activist contestation and interaction with the UN I tracked 
above. In the transition from activism to jurisprudence, 
social critique becomes legal test, and much is at stake 
in this transition. When looking to CEDAW for a way 
to evaluate intersectional claims involving gender, it is 
important to return to Article 2, discussed for its view of 
culture above. CEDAW explicitly ties its interpretation 
of intersectionality to Article 2 of the treaty, which, to 
reiterate, is the article requiring: 
guides the reading of all subsequent articles, discrimination 
itself is defined as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the 
basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field. (para. 1)
It then elaborates in Article 18 of GC 28 that,
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding 
the scope of the general obligations of States parties 
contained in article 2. The discrimination of women 
based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with 
other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, 
religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and 
sexual orientation and gender identity. Discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex or gender may affect women 
belonging to such groups to a different degree or in 
different ways than men. States parties must legally 
recognize and prohibit such intersecting forms of 
discrimination and their compounded negative 
impact on the women concerned. They also need to 
adopt and pursue policies and programmes designed 
to eliminate such occurrences….
Here, CEDAW’s conceptualization of intersectionality 
is more additive than nuanced, and appears to foreclose 
consideration of the role of culture as a source of anything 
Taking the intersection of race and gender as a jumping off point for 
exposing the limitations of single axis analyses of discrimination, the 
two treaty bodies most directly implicated in protecting women’s 
intersectional international human rights, CERD and CEDAW, and their 
committees, have openly embraced the framework.
44 CANADIAN WOMAN STUDIES/LES CAHIERS DE LA FEMME
but further oppression. Certainly, it is not being viewed 
as a site for liberation. 
Historically, when speaking of culture, CEDAW evoked 
criticisms of “stereotyped roles [that] perpetuate widespread 
practices involving violence or coercion, such as family 
violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid 
attacks and female circumcision” (General Comment 19, 
para. 11); practices that are, to be sure, real and discrim-
inatory, but about which some perspective and context 
are required to avoid descent into racist stereotypes. Such 
rights. The Committee established that Canada, as 
party to the Convention and its Optional Protocol, 
had failed to fulfil its obligations under articles 1, 2 
and 16 and that it should provide monetary compen-
sation and housing matching what Kell was deprived 
of. The Committee also recommended recruiting 
and training more aboriginal women to provide legal 
assistance, as well as review Canada’s legal system to 
ensure that aboriginal women victims of domestic 
violence have effective access to justice.17
commentary has “reinforced the notion that metropolitan 
centres of the West contain no tradition or culture harm-
ful to women, and that the violence which does exist is 
idiosyncratic and individualized rather than culturally 
condoned” (Holtmaat and Naber 77). Until recently, 
European forms of violent discrimination against women 
have seldom received the same international attention,14 
and the preoccupation with the lurid and with “alien and 
bizarre” forms of gender persecution (Volpp, “Feminism” 
1208) among human rights advocates echoes colonial 
arrogance (Coomaraswamy [n 2] 486),15 and CEDAW 
appeared often to underscore it. 
However, the rubric of intersectionality now appears 
to be openly shaping subsequent jurisprudence. In such 
decisions as Isatou Jallow vs. Bulgaria, decided in 2012, 
CEDAW held a European state and one of its nationals 
responsible for the violation of the treaty rights of a migrant 
woman on the basis of her daughter’s abuse, and for the 
State’s subsequent lack of remedy.16 In Kell vs. Canada, a 
decision adopted in 2012 in which the committee found 
against Canada, an Aboriginal woman was deemed dis-
criminated against on the basis of gender, in a way that may 
not have been so for a white woman, when her property 
rights were alienated after leaving an abusive relationship 
with a non-Aboriginal man:
The Committee concluded that Kell’s property rights 
had been prejudiced due to a public authority acting 
with her partner, and that she had been discriminated 
against as an aboriginal woman. The Committee also 
found that Canada had failed to provide Kell effective 
legal protection when she sought to regain her property 
Both decisions foreground the specific experiences of 
discrimination against “multidiscriminated” women, and 
expand both the kinds of gender discrimination states are 
required to prevent and the kinds of remediation imposed. 
Both involve fact scenarios very familiar to women’s rights 
advocates in a number of national settings. In the case 
of Kell, the victory is a particularly poignant recasting 
of a famously different decision on similar facts. In the 
1981, Lovelace vs Canada case, predating both CEDAW’s 
individual complaints mechanism and Canada’s Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, the complainant contested 
both the colonial state’s definition of (her) culture and 
the Indigenous male leadership’s collusion with it in 
an access to matrimonial property case. Importantly, 
the complexity of identity presented by Lovelace while 
named in the protections under separate articles in the 
treaty (International Convention for Civil and Political 
Rights), was not recognized in the holding by the com-
mittee adjudicating (Human Rights Commission), who 
found in her favour but on the basis of her Indigenous 
status alone. A great distance has been covered since 
Lovelace on recognizing women’s intersectional identities 
and oppression.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD), who was ahead of the UN pack in 
its adoption of an intersectional framework, set out the 
following basic statement for consideration of an inter-
sectional approach in General Comment 25,
racial discrimination does not always affect women 
and men equally or in the same way. There are 
circumstances in which racial discrimination only 
There is some evidence that the sophistication of intersectionality’s 
theoretical forms, or more pointedly its radical potential, is at best ill 
understood, and, at worst, undermined by the legal domestic orders in 
which it has been deployed and subsequently evaluated by academics.
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or primarily affects women, or affects women in a 
different way, or to a different degree than men. Such 
racial discrimination will often escape detection if 
there is no explicit recognition or acknowledgement 
of the different life experiences of women and men, 
in areas of both public and private life. (para. 1)
The comment is more descriptive than analytical in its 
treatment of intersectionality, but it has set the stage for 
consideration of the intersection of race and gender by 
CERD. This is particularly so in its concluding comments, 
such as on the condition of Malay women in Thailand in 
2013, and the call for gender equality measures in Surinam 
in 2013, or the gendered racism of Liechtenstein and the 
Netherlands in their treatment of migrants and immigrants. 
It has been underscored by the restatement of specific 
requirements on the gender dimensions of discrimination 
against people of African Descent in General Comment 
34.21 Recommendation 25, and intersectionality, has 
reliably found its way into the work of CERD.
Conclusion
There are several conundrums in applying human 
rights in local places. 1. An universal standard using 
legal rationality, yet this stance impedes adapting those 
standards to the particulars of local context. 2. Human 
rights ideas are more readily adopted if they are packaged 
in familiar terms, but they are more transformative if 
they challenge existing assumptions about power and 
relationships 3. To be presented in a local culture, they 
need to be framed in terms of local images, but to receive 
funding, they need to be framed as transnational rights 
principles. 4. The human rights system challenges states 
authority over their citizens at the same time as it rein-
forces states power: both agent of reform and culpable if 
not a direct violator.—Sally Engle Merry (2) 
Intersectionality poses a conundrum for theory and law: 
it is at once an effort at anti-categorical, anti-essentializ-
ing thinking, that is sometimes theory, sometimes social 
science methodology and sometimes legal technique, 
and which, nevertheless categorizes and spotlights—if 
not fixes—social identities for the purposes of exposing 
inequality and disadvantage. It is a powerful critique of the 
hegemonic grasp of law on social access that nevertheless 
engages and works through law. The express use of inter-
sectionality jurisprudentially in the transnational human 
rights field since 2000, provides a unique opportunity 
to interrogate and reform the law’s capacity to account 
for and ameliorate women’s experiences of exclusion and 
discrimination. In this sense, the international context 
as an antidote to insular domestic regimes, building on 
the insight of feminist legal anthropologist Sally Engle 
Merry, that “[t]he global human rights system is now 
deeply transnational, no longer rooted exclusively in 
the west” (2). The sweeping claims of intersectionality 
will continue to need to prove their merits: as deployed 
outside of law, intersectionality has been accused of 
being a “project of limitless scope and limited promise” 
(Conaghan 31); within law, it can likewise be accused of 
doing the work of liberalism’s optimistic reform (Grabham 
et al. 2), narrowly and naively “explaining to the law its 
mistaken assumptions, [and believing this] will lead the 
law/state to a consciousness of its omissions and to rational 
change” (Grabham et al. 2). There is some evidence that 
the sophistication of intersectionality’s theoretical forms, 
or more pointedly its radical potential, is at best ill under-
stood, and, at worst, undermined by the legal domestic 
orders in which it has been deployed and subsequently 
evaluated by academics (Williams). My current research 
is exploring whether the international field augment this 
record with a more fluid and potent antidote to law’s need 
to order, discipline and restrict, ultimately advancing the 
project of feminism’s ambivalent engagement with law. 
Importantly, I ask if it can allow feminism to remain armed 
with its own multifaceted critiques of its own project of 
reform and radicalization. Feminism is unrepentant in its 
engagement with the aporia at the heart of feminist legal 
theories of various stripes: how to radically transform social 
relations through engagement in the present restrictive 
terms of law, without either abandoning the possibility of 
change or falling prey to law as technique and sentinel to 
the status quo? There is little doubt that early exuberance 
about the achievements of women’s rights in domestic 
legal orders (Anderson), despite their great potential, and 
taking Canada as a case in point, has been tempered; 
feminist scholars have come to acknowledge that “the 
courts’ failure to engage deeply with the equality argument 
yields an impoverished and decontextualized analysis 
which allows the differential and prejudicial treatment 
to persist” (Faraday 111). Importantly, this diminished 
law and legal discourse centres on the diminished and 
stripped-down bearer of legal rights, essentialized to a 
single axis of identity, often competing against herself 
for protections that may well apply to her as a complex 
subject, but which are constructed outside intersectional 
approaches to be separate and at odds with one another.22 
In this sense, even as an elaboration of the law’s test or 
grounds of protection in women’s international human 
rights law, intersectionality has something to offer. 
Ultimately, the project of seeking justice through law 
becomes, to paraphrase Ruth Buchanen and Peer Zum-
bansen from a different context, one of scrutinizing law 
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for its ability to “identify process and eventually address 
societal violence and inequality” (24). Intersectionality 
as elaborated at the transnational level has given us a 
vocabulary to deepen this accountability globally and 
domestically. There is evidence that it has begun to deliver 
on its promise. It is up to us to keep it accountable to its 
radical and social justice oriented aims, which exceed the 
traditional bounds of law.
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Endnotes
1See, e.g., Nyamu: “Gender hierarchy can neither be 
understood nor explained by attributing women’s disad-
vantages to a vague notion of culture” (382).
2See e.g. CEDAW Concluding Comments of the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: 
Saudi Arabia, 8 April 2008, CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2.
3This number is taken from the current listing of reserva-
tions available at UN Women, “Declarations, Reservations 
and Objections to CEDAW.” The definition of a reservation 
is taken from the Vienna Treaty of 1969: “‘Reservation’ 
means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, ap-
proving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions 
of the treaty in their application to that State” (Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (art 2 (f )).
4See for example, Morocco, Oman, and Niger in DEDAW, 
“Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW”; 
see also the Committee’s statement that: “Articles 2 and 
16 are considered by the Committee to be core provisions 
of the Convention.”
5By 2003, Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women Radhika Coomeraswamy addressed the matter 
of women’s multiple affiliations in international human 
rights protection with the following disclaimer: “Identity 
is not an essential immutable, permanent status, it has 
many constituent elements. Future experiences often 
transform the nature and direction of personal identity. 
Identity is often composite, made up of multiple selves, 
often contesting, contradicting, and transforming the 
other. Identity therefore reconstitutes itself, reacting to 
and negotiating ideology and lived experience” (490). 
6See preamble regarding “the new economic order based 
on equity and justice,” “eradication of apartheid, all forms 
of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonial-
ism,” the role of “disarmament,” “self-determination and 
independence” as critical to “equality between men and 
women,” in CEDAW.
7Quebec’s Bill 60, the “Charter affirming the values of 
State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality 
between women and men, and providing a framework for 
accommodation requests” is one of Canada’s most visceral 
and infamous of such debates.
8“Intersectionality is the most important theoretical 
contribution that women’s studies, in conjunction with 
related fields, has made so far” (McCall 1771).
9I borrow this from Jennifer C. Nash who speaks of the 
necessity of a reform to intersectionality in order that it 
continue to “grapple with the messiness of subjectivity” (8).
10See “Gender and Racial Discrimination. Report of Expert 
Group Meeting.” 
11The following definition of “sexual violence” is employed 
by the UN: “The term ‘sexual violence’ refers to rape, 
sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, en-
forced sterilization and any other form of sexual violence 
of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men or 
children with a direct or indirect (temporal, geographical 
or causal) link to a conflict. This link to conflict may be 
evident in the profile and motivations of the perpetrator, 
the profile of the victim, the climate of impunity or State 
collapse, any cross-border dimensions or violations of the 
terms of a ceasefire agreement” (Sexual Violence in Conflict).
12See Women Forging a New Security (Nobel Women’s 
Peace Initiative).
13Declaration on the Elimination of All forms of Intoler-
ance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief 
(1981); United Nations Convention of the Rights of the 
Child (1989); International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (1990); Declaration on the rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities (1992); Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (2006); United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) (see Ghandi); 
and the Yogakarta Principles (2007). 
14Holtmaat and Naber make the point that article 5 of CE-
DAW could be evoked to call attention to the widespread 
practice of cosmetic surgeries on women in “developed” 
nations, for example.
15See, also, Volpp (“Feminism”), who, however, does not 
specifically refer to CEDAW or the international context.
16Communication No. 32/2011, UN Doc. CE-
DAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (28 August 2012). 
17See, for the analysis of the case, “Women’s Rights Body 
VOLUME 33, NUMBERS 1,2 47




20CERD/C/LIE/CO/4-6 (2012), and CERD/C/NLD/
CO/17-18 (2010), respectively. 
21“Include in all reports to the Committee information 
on the measures taken to implement the Convention that 
specifically address racial discrimination against women 
of African descent” (CERD/C/GC/34).
22A classic example from the international human rights 
context is Sandra Lovelace v. Canada [1977-1981]. San-
dra Lovelace presents herself as neither subsumed by nor 
divorced from culture, but in critical negotiation with it. 
Lovelace was shut out of her right to “access to culture in 
community with others” (ICCPR, article 27) as an Indig-
enous person, but on the basis of matrimonial property 
rights which divested women who married outside of 
the community differently than it did men who did the 
same. Lovelace argued her case under the International 
Convention for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 
the basis of discrimination as an Indigenous person and 
as a woman experiencing “sex discrimination” (articles 1 
and 2). The state’s defense rested on its contention that 
the patriarchy of her community determined her loss of 
entitlement, and that, in order to respect their autonomy 
(group rights), the state could not protect her rights as 
a woman (individual right). Lovelace countered this by 
submitting evidence that traditional Indigenous culture 
was not patriarchal, and that this was a colonial distortion 
of it. Lovelace thus contested both the colonial state’s 
definition of (her) culture and the Indigenous male lead-
ership’s collusion with it. Importantly, this complexity of 
identity, or revelation of symmetry between the patriarchal 
state and “cultural” leadership was not recognized in the 
holding by the HRC, although Lovelace did win the case 
on the basis of article 27 (not articles 1and 2).
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cassandra myers
Autobiography of Cassandra
I saw the fall of Troy in a vision—
a wooden beast charging through city gates, 
men gifted daggers from my father’s armory 
worming its belly
—for I was the arborist
who surgeoned the timber steed and spit the 
gasoline of truth
on my people’s velvet robes.
They shook their heads twice—like a blind 
horse.
The first when a man
stripped the bark from my kneeled limbs. The 
last when the men
impregnated the sequoian stallion.
She’s confused, they said,
roused too early from a midday nap.
Swinging a flaming hatchet
at my devilish pet, my mother snatched me by 
my scalp
to save what was left of our family name.
A mad woman’s curse is reverse psychology—
doing what’s expected
to be clinically unbelievable, sterilized
of violence. I pulled out a hair for every person 
I told. I bought
a parthenon of flame-retardant wigs:
the perch from which I watched their chorus of 
red hot apologies.
I died old with a clean scalp and a cleaner 
conscience.
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Lying in hospital, as the British say
Cleanliness, order arrives in its antiseptic way.
I decide to roll over, sleep in crisp, clean sheets
Measures of fertility and poems soon arrive
In the fine, great hospital of rhyme.
In a dream, I scan the back lot
Covered in nettles as it sometimes is
Nettles that sting, challenging
“Don’t touuch! You’ll frighten the fairies 
away.”
A dream only, of course.
I dream, a cool day, crisp sheets
And not too much string.
Wandering the ordered corridors of time.
Wondering.
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